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SAHCHIN
Antony (2)

IC 74-2170
13 December 1974

K1 MEMORANDUM FOR: []

SUBJECT: PRD Meeting with NIB Editors in re Problems
with DIA

25X1 1. Apropos of my memorandum of 11 December, [] and I
met yesterday with [] the NIB editor, and with his DIA
assistant editor, [] USAF. 25X

25X1 2. Among the principal purposes of our talk was to determine from
the NIB staff why there was this imbalance in military intelligence
production, i.e. 74% of the military intelligence products in the NIB
being produced by CIA. The reasons given were these:

a. The aggressive approach of OSR to intelligence production,
i.e. OSR normally nominates more military intelligence items than
does DI/DIA.

b. When both OSR and DI write on the same subject, the
quality of the OSR product is usually superior.

c. The difficulty which DI/DIA continues to have in producing
items suitable for the national intelligence audience, (though the
NIB staff says DIA is improving in this regard).

d. The fact that DIA's DIN product apparently has that agency's
first production priority and consequently absorbs the time and
efforts of DIA's best production analysts.

3. The NIB staff appears to be sensitive to the problem and is
taking these steps in order to increase DIA's share of the NIB:

a. It is taking on several additional DIA editors on a ro-
tational basis (a few weeks) to better acquaint DIA with both the
style and standards of the NIB and its production problems.

b. Wherever possible, it will give joint CIA/DIA attribution
to certain articles, even if they contain less than a 50% contri-
bution by DIA.

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c. It will lower the threshold of acceptance of DIA contributions to the NIB.

4. Our response to these ideas was: (a) most favorable to the idea of rotational editors; (b) guarded on the joint attribution idea as it might tend to "subsidize" sub-standard performance; and (c) unfavorable to lowering the threshold of acceptance of NIB products. On the last point, we noted the attached article in the 12 December NIB concerning Indian Navy submarine order of battle. This article seemed to us to be unsuitable for the national audience.

5. Regardless of these measures, the bad news is that the NIB staff does not hold out great hope for a quantum increase in DIA's share of the NIB until DIA adjusts its internal production priorities. So long as DINs and other internal DoD requirements command first priority, the NIB is likely to get short shrift.

6. However, the good news is that there is something to be said for PRD's continued close communications with the NIB staff. While it may have been happenstance, we note that two and a half of the five military intelligence articles in the NIB of 12 December were authored by DIA and the "For the Record" section had six military intelligence items.

7. In closing, as we all agreed that DIA was not likely to change its production priorities without new orders from the top, [redacted] offered to take up the matter with [redacted]. However, the NIB editors backed off at this point and requested more time (90 days) to try to work it out themselves. Dick and I are of the opinion that unless DIA's NIB performance dramatically improves, we are likely to receive a rocket from [redacted] on this issue long before the 90 days are up.

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[redacted]
Colonel, USMC

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Attachment - As Stated

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Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000700210003-3

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